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Abstract—We consider a fading wiretap channel model where
the transmitter has only statistical channel state information, and
the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper have perfect channel
state information. We propose a sequence of non-random lattice
codes which achieve strong secrecy and semantic security over
ergodic fading channels. The construction is almost universal
in the sense that it achieves the same constant gap to secrecy
capacity over Gaussian and ergodic fading models.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel model was introduced by Wyner [21],
who showed that secure and reliable communication can be
achieved simultaneously over noisy channels even without
the use of secret keys. In the information theory community,
the most widely accepted secrecy metric is Csisza´r’s strong
secrecy: the mutual information I(M;Zn) between the confi-
dential message M and the channel output Zn should vanish
when the code length n tends to infinity.
While in the information theory community confidential
messages are often assumed to be uniformly distributed, this
assumption is not accepted in cryptography. A cryptographic
treatment of the wiretap channel was proposed in [3] to com-
bine the requirements of the two communities, establishing
that achieving semantic security in the cryptographic sense
is equivalent to achieving strong secrecy for all distributions
of the message. This equivalence holds also for continuous
channels [10].
In the case of Gaussian wiretap channels, [10] considered
the problem of designing lattice codes which achieve strong
secrecy and semantic security. Following an approach by
Csisza´r [5, 4], strong secrecy is guaranteed if the output
distributions of the eavesdropper’s channel corresponding to
two different messages are indistinguishable in the sense of
variational distance. Moreover, the flatness factor of a lattice
was proposed in [10] as a fundamental criterion which implies
that conditional outputs are indistinguishable. Using random
lattice coding arguments, it was shown that there exist families
of lattice codes which are “good for secrecy”, meaning that
their flatness factor is vanishing, and achieve semantic security
for rates up to 1/2 nat from the secrecy capacity.
In this paper, we consider a fading wiretap channel model
where the transmitter has only access to statistical channel
state information (CSI), while the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper both have perfect knowledge of their own
channels. We extend the criterion based on the flatness factor
to the case of fading channels and propose a family of non-
random lattice codes from algebraic number fields satisfying
this criterion. We note that ideal lattices from number fields
were already considered for secrecy under an error probability
criterion for Gaussian and fading channels in [1, 2, 8, 16] and
related works.
In this paper, we consider a particular sequence of algebraic
number fields with constant root discriminant. In [20, 11], it
was shown that these lattice codes are “almost universal” in
the sense that they achieve a constant gap to channel capacity
over any ergodic stationary fading channel. The underlying
multiplicative structure and constant root discriminant property
guarantee that the received lattice after fading has a good
minimum distance when the channel is not in outage.
The sequences of number fields that we consider are also
used in the crypto literature for worst-case to average-case
reductions of hard lattice problems [18].
In this work, we show that these lattices also achieve strong
secrecy and semantic security. The key feature is that the dual
of the faded lattice has good minimum distance, so that the
average flatness factor of the faded lattice vanishes.
In particular, for the Gaussian case this suggests a simple
design criterion where the packing density of the lattice and
its dual should be maximized simultaneously. We note that the
dual code also plays a role in the design of LDPC codes for
binary erasure wiretap channels [19].
We also improve the rate of almost universal codes by
replacing spherical shaping with a discrete Gaussian distri-
bution over the infinite lattice as in [10]. As a consequence,
our nested lattice schemes achieve the same constant gap to
secrecy capacity over all static and ergodic fading models.
The proposed lattice codes can be generalized in a straight-
forward manner to the multi-antenna case using the multiblock
matrix lattices from division algebras in [11]. This generaliza-
tion will be presented in an upcoming journal version.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Flatness factor and discrete Gaussian distribution
In this section, we define some fundamental lattice param-
eters that will be used in the rest of the paper. For more
background about the smoothing parameter and the flatness
factor in information theory and cryptography, we refer the
reader to [15, 10, 17].
Consider Ck as a 2k-dimensional real vector space with a real
inner product 〈x,y〉 = ℜ(x†y). This inner product naturally
defines a metric on Ck by setting ‖x‖ =√〈x,x〉. 1
Given a complex lattice Λ ⊂ Ck, we define the dual lattice as
Λ∗ = {x ∈ Ck | ∀y ∈ Λ, 〈x,y〉 ∈ Z}.
Let f√Σ,c(z) denote the k-dimensional complex normal dis-
tribution with mean c and covariance matrix Σ:
f√Σ,c(z) =
1
πk det(Σ)
e−(z−c)
†Σ−1(z−c) ∀z ∈ Ck.
We will use the notation fσ,c(z) for fσI,c(z).
Definition 1: Given a complex lattice Λ ⊂ Ck, the flatness
factor ǫΛ(
√
Σ) is defined as the maximum deviation of the
Gaussian distribution over Λ from the uniform distribution
over a fundamental region R(Λ) of Λ, with volume V (Λ):
ǫΛ(
√
Σ) = max
z∈R(Λ)
∣∣∣∣∣V (Λ)∑
λ∈Λ
f√Σ,λ(z) − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Compared to [10], in this paper we use an extended version
of the flatness factor for correlated Gaussians, related to the
extended notion of the smoothing parameter in [17]. We also
extend the definition to the case of complex lattices.
Note that correlations can be absorbed by the lattice in the
sense that ǫΛ(
√
Σ) = ǫ√
Σ
−1
Λ
(I), and that ǫΛ(
√
Σ1) ≤
ǫΛ(
√
Σ2) if Σ1 and Σ2 are two positive definite matrices with
Σ1  Σ2.
Definition 2: Given a lattice Λ and ǫ > 0, the smoothing
parameter2 ηǫ(Λ) is the smallest s =
√
2πσ > 0 such that∑
λ∗∈Λ∗\{0} e
−π2σ2‖λ∗‖2 ≤ ǫ, where Λ∗ is the dual lattice.
To extend the definition to matrices we can say that
√
2πΣ  ηǫ(Λ) if ǫΛ(Σ) ≤ ǫ. (1)
The smoothing parameter is upper bounded by the minimum
distance of the dual lattice [15]:
ηǫ(Λ) ≤ 2
√
k
λ1(Λ∗)
. (2)
Finally, given c ∈ Ck and σ > 0, we define the discrete
Gaussian distribution over the (shifted) lattice Λ− c ⊂ Ck as
the following discrete distribution taking values in Λ− c:
DΛ−c,σ(λ − c) = fσ(λ− c)
fσ,c(Λ)
.
The following result is a consequence of [17, Theorem 3.1]
and extends Lemma 8 in [10]:
Lemma 1: Let X1 be sampled according to the discrete
Gaussian distribution DΛ+c,√Σ1 and X2 be sampled according
1This inner product corresponds to identifying Ck with R2k with
the canonical real inner product, through the isometry φ(z1, . . . , zk) =
(ℜ(z1), . . . ,ℜ(zk),ℑ(zk), . . . ,ℑ(zk)). Note also that if Σ = Σ†, then
〈z,Σz〉 = ℜ(z†Σz) = z†Σz = φ(z)TΣRφ(z), where ΣR =(ℜ(Σ) −ℑ(Σ)
ℑ(Σ) ℜ(Σ)
)
. In particular, the properties of real Gaussian distribu-
tions carry over to circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distributions.
2Note that we define the smoothing parameter per complex dimension,
which differs by a factor
√
2 from the definition in [15]. We have adjusted
the bounds on ηǫ(Λ) accordingly.
to the continuous Gaussian f√Σ2 . Let Σ0 = Σ1 + Σ2 and
Σ−1 = Σ−11 +Σ
−1
2 . If
ǫΛ(
√
Σ) ≤ ǫ ≤ 1
2
, (3)
then the distribution g of X = X1 + X2 is close to f√Σ0 :
V(g, f√Σ0) ≤ 4ǫ,
where V( , ) is the L1 distance.
B. Ideal lattices from number fields with constant root dis-
criminant
Let F be a number field of degree [F : Q] = n, with ring of
integers OF . We denote by dF the discriminant of the number
field. We define the codifferent of F as
O∨F = {x ∈ K : TrF/Q(xOF ) ⊆ Z}.
The codifferent is a fractional ideal, that is, there exists some
integer a such that aO∨F is a proper ideal of OF , and its
algebraic norm is the inverse of the discriminant:
N(O∨F ) = 1/dF . (4)
We will focus on the case of totally complex extensions F/Q
of degree n = 2k. The relative canonical embedding of F
into Ck is given by
ψ(x) = (σ1(x), . . . , σk(x)),
where {σ1, . . . , σk} is a set of Q-embeddings F → C such
that we have chosen one from each complex conjugate pair.
Then Λ = ψ(OF ) is a lattice in Ck. The codifferent embeds
as the complex conjugate of the dual lattice:
Λ∗ = 2ψ(O∨F ). (5)
Using (2), we obtain
ηǫ(Λ) ≤
√
k
λ1(ψ(O∨F ))
. (6)
From the AM-GM inequality we have that for any fractional
ideal I of OF ,
λ1(ψ(I)) ≥
√
k(N(I)) 12k .
In particular, from (4) we get
λ1(ψ(O∨F )) = λ1(ψ(O∨F )) ≥
√
k
|dF |
1
2k
. (7)
Combining equations (6) and (7), we find that the smoothing
parameter of Λ is upper bounded by the root discriminant [18,
Lemma 6.5]: given ǫ = 2−2k,
ηǫ(Λ) ≤ |dF |
1
2k . (8)
The following theorem by Martinet [13] proves the exis-
tence of infinite towers of totally complex number fields with
constant root discriminant.
Theorem 2.1: There exists an infinite tower of totally com-
plex number fields {Fk} of degree 2k = 5 · 2t, such that
|dFk |
1
2k = G, (9)
for G ≈ 92.368.
We now focus on the corresponding lattice sequence Λ(k) ⊂
Ck. Their volume is a function of the discriminant:
Vol(Λ(k)) = 2−k
√
|dF | = 2−kGk (10)
Let ǫ = 2−2k. From Theorem 2.1 and equation (8),
ηǫ(Λ
(k)) ≤ |dF |
1
2k = G.
Since the flatness factor is a decreasing function of σ,
∀σ > G√
2π
, εΛ(k)(σ) ≤ 2−2k. (11)
III. FADING WIRETAP CHANNEL
We consider an ergodic fading channel model where the
outputs Yk and Zk at Bob and Eve’s end are given by{
Yi = Hb,iXi +Wb,i,
Zi = He,iXi +We,i,
i = 1, . . . , k (12)
where Wb,i, We,i are i.i.d. complex Gaussian vectors with zero
mean and variance σ2b , σ2e per complex dimension. The input
X
k satisfies the average power constraint
1
k
k∑
i=1
|Xi|2 ≤ P. (13)
We suppose that Hb,i, He,i are isotropically invariant channels
such that the channel capacities Cb and Ce are well-defined
and the weak law of large numbers holds: ∀δ > 0,
lim
k→∞
P
{∣∣∣∣∣1k
k∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
P
σ2b
|hb,i|2
)
− Cb
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
}
= 0, (14)
lim
k→∞
P
{∣∣∣∣∣1k
k∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
P
σ2e
|he,i|2
)
− Ce
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
}
= 0. (15)
All rates are expressed in nats per complex channel use.
We suppose that Alice has no instantaneous CSIT (apart from
knowledge of channel statistics), and Bob and Eve have perfect
CSI of their own channels. A confidential message M and
an auxiliary message M′ with rate R and R′ respectively
are encoded into Xk . We denote by Mˆ the estimate of the
confidential message at Bob’s end.
Definition 3: A coding scheme achieves strong secrecy if
lim
k→∞
P{Mˆ 6= M} = 0, (reliability condition)
lim
k→∞
I(M;Zk,Hke) = 0. (secrecy condition)
The secrecy capacity for this wiretap model is given by [9]
Cs = Cb − Ce. (16)
Let Λ(k) ⊂ Ck be the lattice sequence defined in the
previous section. We consider scaled versions Λb = αbΛ(k),
Λe = αeΛ
(k) such that Λe ⊂ Λb and |Λb/Λe| = ekR.
We consider the secrecy scheme in [10], where each con-
fidential message m ∈ M = {1, . . . , ekR} is associated to
a coset leader λm ∈ Λb ∩ R(Λe) for a fundamental region
R(Λe). To transmit the message m, Alice samples Xk from
the discrete Gaussian DΛe+λm,σs with σ2s = P . It follows
from [10, Lemma 6] that as k →∞, the variance per complex
dimension of Xk tends to P provided that
lim
k→∞
ǫΛe(
√
P ) = 0. (17)
From [10, Lemma 7], the information rate R′ of the auxiliary
message (corresponding to the choice of a point in Λe) is
R′ ≈ ln(πeP )− 1
k
lnV (Λe) = ln(πeP )− 1
k
ln(α2ke 2
−kGk).
Therefore, we have
α2e ≈
2πeP
GeR′
. (18)
From (11), ǫΛe(
√
P ) = ǫαeΛ(
√
P ) = ǫΛ
(√
P/αe
)
→ 0
provided that
√
P
αe
> G2π , and (17) holds for
R′ > ln(eG/2) = ln(G/2) + 1. (19)
We now state the main result of the paper which will be
proven in the following sections:
Proposition 1: The proposed wiretap coding scheme with
σ2s = P achieves strong secrecy for any message distribution
pM (and thus semantic security) for any secrecy rate
R < Cb − Ce − ln
(
2G2/π
)
.
A. Secrecy
The received lattice at Eve’s end is HeΛ, where He =
diag(He,1, . . . ,He,k). Since the message M and the channel
H
k
e are independent, the leakage can be expressed as follows:
I(M;Zk,Hke) = I(M;H
k
e) + I(M;Z
k|He) = I(M;Zk|He) =
= EHe
[
I(pM|He ; pZk|He)
]
= EHe
[
I(pM; pZk|He)
]
We want to show that the average leakage with respect
to the fading is small. In order to do so, we will show
that the output distributions pZk|He are close to a Gaussian
distribution with high probability. For a fixed realization He =
diag(he,1, . . . , he,k), HeX
k ∼ D
HeΛe+Heλm,
√
HeH
†
e
√
P
. Us-
ing Lemma 1 with Σ1 = HeH†eP , Σ2 = σ2b I ,
V(pZk|He , fΣ0) ≤ ǫ (20)
provided that
εHeΛe(
√
Σ) = ε√
Σ
−1
HeΛe
(1) ≤ ǫ ≤ 1
2
, (21)
where we define Σ0 = HeH†eP + σ2b I , Σ =
(HeH
†
e )
−1
P +
I
σ2
b
.
If (20) holds, then it follows from [10, Lemma 2] that
I(pM; pZk|He) ≤ 8kǫR− 8ǫ log 8ǫ. (22)
Recalling the upper bound (2), we have
ηǫ(
√
Σ−1HeΛ) ≤ 2
√
k
λ1(
√
Σ(H†e )−1Λ∗)
. (23)
Using (5) and the arithmetic mean - geometric mean inequality,
λ1(
√
Σ(H†e )
−1Λ∗) = 2λ1(
√
Σ(H†e)
−1ψ(O∨F )) =
= 2 min
x∈O∨F\{0}
∥∥∥√Σ(H†e )−1ψ(x)∥∥∥ ≥
≥ 2 min
x∈O∨F\{0}
√
k
k∏
i=1
(
Pσ2e
σ2e + P |he,i|2
) 1
2k k∏
i=1
|σi(x)|
1
k =
=
2
√
k
√
Pσe
G
∏k
i=1(σ
2
e + P |he,i|2) 12k
.
The last equality follows from the fact that
min
x∈O∨
F
\{0}
∏k
i=1
|σi(x)|
1
k = min
a∈O∨
F
\{0}
∣∣NK/Q(a)∣∣ 12k =
= N(O∨F )
1
2k =
1
|dF |1/2k
=
1
G
. (24)
Replacing in (23), we find that for ǫ = 2−2k,
ηǫ(
√
Σ−1HeΛ) ≤ G
∏k
i=1
(σ2e + P |he,i|2)
1
2k /
√
Pσe.
Equivalently, in terms of flatness factor we have
ε√Σ−1HeΛ
(
G
∏k
i=1(σ
2
e + P |he,i|2)
1
2k√
2πPσe
)
≤ 2−2k
for fixed fading He. Given δ > 0, the law of large numbers
(15) implies that P
{∏k
i=1
(
1 + Pσ2e
|he,i|2
) 1
k
> eCe+δ
}
→ 0.
Now suppose that
αeGe
Ce+δ
2 /
√
2πP ≤ 1. (25)
We can bound the leakage as follows:
EHe
[
I(pM; pZk|He)
] ≤
≤ P
{ k∏
i=1
(
1 +
P |he,i|2
σ2e
) 1
k
> eCe+δ
}
(kR)+
+ EHe
[
I(pM; pZk|He)
∣∣∣ k∏
i=1
(
1 +
P |he,i|2
σ2e
) 1
k≤ eCe+δ
]
(26)
The first term vanishes when k →∞.
Now consider the second term. Under the hypothesis that∏k
i=1
(
1 + Pσ2e
|he,i|2
) 1
k ≤ eCe+δ , we have
ε√Σ−1HeΛe(1) = εαe
√
Σ−1HeΛ
(1) ≤ ε√Σ−1HeΛ
(
Ge
Ce+δ
2√
2πP
)
≤
≤ ε√Σ−1HeΛ
(
G
∏k
i=1(σ
2
e + P |he,i|2)
1
2k√
2πPσe
)
≤ 2−2k.
Using (22), the second term is also vanishing and the lattice
coding scheme achieves strong secrecy over Eve’s channel.
From the conditions (25) and (18), we find that in order to
have strong secrecy we need eGeCe+δ ≤ eR′ , or equivalently
R′ ≥ Ce+ δ+1+ ln(G). Since this is true for any δ > 0, we
find that a rate
R′ ≥ Ce + 1 + ln(G). (27)
is required for secrecy.
Remark 1: Although we focused on ergodic fading, the
same scheme achieves strong secrecy over the Gaussian and
static fading wiretap channels. In fact, for these models the
first term in (26) is zero, and the second term still vanishes.
B. Reliability
We suppose that Bob performs MMSE-GDFE preprocessing
as in [6]: let ρb = Pσ2
b
, and consider the QR decomposition
H˜ =
(
H
1
ρb
I
)
=
(
Q1
Q2
)
.
Observe that ‖y −Hbx‖2 + 1ρb ‖x‖
2
=
∥∥∥Q†1y −Rx∥∥∥2 + C,
where C is some constant which does not depend on x.
Since the distribution of x is not uniform, MAP decoding is
not equivalent to ML. However, similarly to [10, Theorem 5],
for fixed Hb which is known at the receiver, the result of MAP
decoding can be written as
xˆMAP = argmax
x∈Λb
p(x|y) = argmax
x∈Λb
p(x)p(y|x) =
= argmax
x∈Λb
e−
‖x‖2
2P e
−‖y−Hbx‖
2
2σ2
b =
= argmin
x∈Λb
(
1
ρb
‖x‖2 + ‖y −Hbx‖2
)
= argmin
x∈Λb
∥∥∥Q†1y −Rx∥∥∥2
Thus, Bob can compute
y′ = Q†1y = Rx+ v,
where v = Q†1wb − 1ρb (R−1)†x [6]. The noise v is the
sum of a discrete Gaussian with distribution DΛ′,√Σ1 , where
Λ′ = 1ρb (R
−1)†Λb, Σ1 =
σ2b
ρb
(RR†)−1, and of a continuous
Gaussian random variable f√Σ2 , where Σ2 = σ
2
bQ1Q
†
1.
For any message m ∈ M, Pe(m) ≤ P {v /∈ V(RΛb)} and
consequently the same upper bound holds for the the average:
Pe =
∑
m∈M
Pe(m)p(m) ≤ P {v /∈ V(RΛb)} .
Although v is not Gaussian, we will show that its tails behave
similarly to a Gaussian random variable.
A random vector v taking values in Ck is δ-subgaussian with
parameter σ if ∀t ∈ Ck, E[eℜ(t†v)] ≤ eδe σ22 ‖t‖2 . Note that
for a complex Gaussian vector z ∼ NC(0,Σ), E[eℜ(t†v)] =
e
1
2 t
†Σt
.
Let’s suppose that a fixed message m has been transmitted, so
that Xk ∼ DΛe+λm,√P . The following result holds (see also[14, Lemma 2.8]).
Lemma 2: Let Xk ∼ DΛ+c,σ be a k-dimensional discrete
complex Gaussian random variable, and let A ∈ Mk(C).
Suppose that ǫΛ(σ) < 1. Then ∀t ∈ Ck,
E[eℜ(t
†Ax)] ≤
(
1 + ǫΛ(σ)
1− ǫΛ(σ)
)
e
σ2
2 ‖A†t‖2 .
It follows that Xk is δ-subgaussian with parameter
√
P for
δ = ln
(
1+ǫ
1−ǫ
)
provided that ǫ = ǫΛe(
√
P ) < 1, which is
guaranteed by (19). This is weaker than the condition (27)
we have already imposed for secrecy, so it doesn’t affect the
achievable rate. Consequently, for the equivalent noise v,
E[eℜ(t
†
v)] = E
[
eℜ(t
†Q†1wb)
]
E
[
e
−ℜ
(
1
ρb
t
†(R−1)†x
)]
≤
≤
(
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
)
e
σ2
b
2 t
†
(
Q†1Q1+
1
ρb
(R−1)†R−1
)
t
=
(
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
)
e
σ2
b
2 ‖t‖2 .
This implies that the tails of v vanish exponentially fast: from
[7, Theorem 2.1], it follows that ∀t > 0,
P
{
‖v‖2 /kσ2b > 1 + 2
√
t/k + 2t
}
≤ eδe−t.
In particular, taking η =
√
t
k , we find that ∀η > 0,
P
{
‖v‖2 /kσ2b > 1 + η
}
≤ eδe−kη2 .
Let dR denote the minimum distance in the received lattice:
d2R = min
λ∈Λb\{0}
k∑
i=1
|Riλi|2 = min
x∈ψ(OF )\{0}
α2b
k∑
i=1
|Rixi|2 ≥
≥ min
x∈ψ(OF )\{0}
α2bk
k∏
i=1
(
1
ρb
+ |hb,i|2
) 1
k
k∏
i=1
|xi|
1
k ≥
≥ α2bk
k∏
i=1
(
1
ρb
+ |hb,i|2
) 1
k
. (28)
The previous bound follows from the AM-GM inequality and
the fact that the minimum non-zero norm of the code is 1. We
use the same argument as in [11] to bound Pe: given η > 0,
Pe ≤ P {v /∈ V(RΛb)} ≤ P {v /∈ B(dR/2)} ≤
≤ P
{
‖v‖2
kσ2b
≥ 1 + η
}
+ P
{
d2R
4kσ2b
< 1 + η
}
. (29)
Since the first term vanishes exponentially fast when k →∞,
we can focus on the second term. From (28), the second term
in (29) is upper bounded by
P
{
α2b
4σ2b
k∏
i=1
(
1
ρb
+ |hb,i|2
) 1
k
< 1 + η
}
=
= P
{
1
k
k∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + ρb |hb,i|2
)
< ln
(
4P (1 + η)
α2b
)}
=
= P
{
1
k
k∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + ρb |hb,i|2
)
< ln
(
2GeRb(1 + η)
πe
)}
,
recalling that α2b ≈ 2πePGeRb from (18) and the fact that|Λb/Λe| = ekR. Since the left hand side tends to Cb when
k →∞ due to the law of large numbers (14), the last expres-
sion will vanish provided that Rb < Cb− ln
(
2G
πe
)− ln(1+η).
Since η is arbitrary, any rate
Rb = R+R
′ < Cb − ln (2G/πe) (30)
is achievable for Bob. From equations (27) and (30), the pro-
posed coding scheme achieves strong secrecy for any message
distribution (and thus semantic security) for any secrecy rate
R < Cb − Ce − ln
(
2G2/π
)
.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Cong Ling’s work was supported in part by FP7 project
PHYLAWS (EU FP7-ICT 317562). The research of R.
Vehkalahti was funded by Finnish Cultural Foundation.
The authors would like to thank Jean-Claude Belfiore and
Hamed Mirghasemi for useful discussions.
REFERENCES
[1] J.-C. Belfiore, F. Oggier, “Lattice code design for the Rayleigh fading
wiretap channel”, IEEE International Conference on Communications
(ICC) 2011
[2] J.-C. Belfiore, F. Oggier, “An error probability approach to MIMO
wiretap channels”, IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61 n. 8, 2013
[3] M. Bellare, S. Tessaro, and A. Vardy, “Semantic security for the wiretap
channel”, Advances in Cryptology, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 7417, Springer-Verlag, 2012, pp. 294–311.
[4] M. Bloch and J. Laneman, “Strong secrecy from channel resolvability”,
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 59, no. 12, pp. 8077–8098, Dec. 2013.
[5] I. Csisza´r, “Almost independence and secrecy capacity”, Problems of
Information Transmission, vol. 32, pp. 40–47, 1996.
[6] H. El Gamal, G. Caire, M. O. Damen, “Lattice coding and decoding
achieve the optimal diversity-multiplexing tradeoff of MIMO channels”,
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 50, n. 6, pp. 968–985, 2004
[7] D. Hsu, S. M. Kakade, T. Zhang, “A tail inequality for quadratic forms
of subgaussian random vectors”, Electron. Commun. Probab. 17 (2012),
no. 52, 1–6.
[8] D. Karpuk, A.-M. Ernvall-Hyto¨nen, C. Hollanti, E. Viterbo, “Probability
estimates for fading and wiretap channels from Ideal Class Zeta Func-
tions”, Advances in Mathematics of Communication vol. 9 n. 4, pp.
391–413, 2015
[9] S.-C. Lin, “On ergodic secrecy capacity of fast fading MIMOME wiretap
channel with statistical CSIT”, Signal and Information Processing
Association Annual Summit and Conference (APSIPA), 2013
[10] C. Ling, L. Luzzi, J.-C. Belfiore, D. Stehle´, “Semantically Secure Lattice
Codes for the Gaussian Wiretap Channel”, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol.
60, no. 10, pp. 6399-6416, Oct. 2014
[11] L. Luzzi, R. Vehkalahti, “Almost universal codes achieving ergodic
MIMO capacity within a constant gap”, arxiv.org/pdf/1507.07395
[12] V. Lyubashevsky, C. Peikert, O. Regev, “On ideal lattices and learning
with errors”, Journal ACM, vol. 60, n. 6, Nov. 2013
[13] J. Martinet, “Tours de corps de classes et estimations de discriminants”,
Inventiones Mathematicae n. 44, 1978, pp. 65–73.
[14] D. Micciancio and C. Peikert, “Trapdoors for lattices: Simpler, tighter,
faster, smaller”, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2012, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science vol 7237, pp. 700–718
[15] D. Micciancio and O. Regev, “Worst-case to average-case reductions
based on Gaussian measures”, in Proc. Ann. Symp. Found. Computer
Science, Rome, Italy, Oct. 2004, pp. 372–381.
[16] S. S. Ong, F. Oggier, “Wiretap lattice codes from number fields with no
small norm elements”, Designs, Codes and Cryptography, vol 73 n.2,
pp. 425–440, 2014
[17] C. Peikert, “An efficient and parallel Gaussian sampler for lattices”,
Proc. CRYPTO, vol. 6223, Springer-Verlag, 2010, pp. 80–97.
[18] C. Peikert and A. Rosen, “Lattices that admit logarithmic worst-case to
average-case connection factors”, Proc. STOC, pp. 478–487, 2007.
[19] A. Subramanian, A. Thangaraj, M. Bloch, S. W. McLaughlin, “Strong
Secrecy on the Binary Erasure Wiretap Channel Using Large-Girth
LDPC Codes”, IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensic Secur., vol.6, no.3, pp. 585–
594, 2011
[20] R. Vehkalahti and L. Luzzi, “Number field lattices achieve Gaussian and
Rayleigh channel capacity within a constant gap”, in IEEE Int. Symp.
Inform. Theory (ISIT), June 2015
[21] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel”, Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
